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It Takes a Village to Make a Difference: 
Continuing the Spirit of Copyright 
By Stella Brown* 
The year is 2003, and Betty Lu Brown, a now-famous blues singer and songwriter, sits in 
deep thought reminiscing about her successful and long-standing music career. She 
continues to hear her music played over the radio and through the car windows of her 
now-mature fans, even though she has not released an album for over a decade. Each 
time she hears her music playing, she cannot help but wonder how much money her 
publishers and record labels are making from her music, compared to her own earnings. 
She was very young when she signed her contract and transferred her copyright rights to 
the music entities. She had no idea her music would produce so many hits. 
 
Betty is now debating whether she should take advantage of 17 U.S.C. § 203, a provision 
added to the Copyright Act of 1976 that would allow her to terminate the transfer of 
rights she gave away thirty-five years prior in 1978. According to the statute, 2003 is the 
first year she can provide the music entities with notice of termination. Because her first 
album came out in 1978, and she wrote and sang each song on the album, Betty’s rights 
can revert back to her in the year 2013. That year will be the first time anyone can 
terminate a grant of transfer.  
 
On the other hand, Betty recognizes that her record label and publisher make a lot of 
money from her songs and may not want to give back her music. She also understands 
that she might have to go to court, but is worried about the outcome. She wonders what 
arguments her publisher and record label will have, as well as how courts will handle 
this novel issue. Betty knows she has a lot to think about and only a short time to 
make a decision.  
 
This Note will discuss the issue of copyright termination and the difficulties songwriters 
and music artists will experience when they attempt to terminate the grants in their music 
that they provided to publishers and recording labels beginning in 1978. The Note 
addresses this issue in two ways through the context of the Scorpio Music S.A v. Willis 
case. First, the Note provides the many arguments publishers and recording labels will 
argue in an attempt to keep rights in songwriters’ and music artists’ songs. Secondly, the 
Note provides the counterarguments from the songwriters and music artists that will 
likely outweigh the arguments of the music entities. The Note concludes that the 
songwriters’ and artists’ arguments will likely be most successful and that only time will 
tell which side the court system will seem to favor.   
 
* J.D., 2014, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Professor Peter DiCola for 
his continued support during the drafting of this article, and for helping me to think critically about many of 
the issues and arguments raised by copyright termination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
¶1  Beginning in 2013, every year will bring with it the opportunity for music artists 
and songwriters to reclaim rights they gave away thirty-five years prior. 17 U.S.C § 203, 
introduced by the Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976 Act”), allows them to do so.1 The 
provision allows artists and songwriters who granted transfers of their copyrights in their 
works to publishing companies and recording labels in 1978 to be the first group to 
terminate those rights in 2013.2 As artists and songwriters exercise their termination 
rights, publishing companies and recording labels will offer many arguments why they 
are entitled to hold on to the music. Given the forthcoming terminations and decrease in 
the industry’s revenue within the past few years, recording and publishing executives feel 
 
1 Though 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006) applies to all areas of copyright, this paper will focus on termination in 
the music context.  
2 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2006). 
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especially pressured to produce revenue. They possibly need the royalties that extend 
from those musical works and sound recordings.3 The upcoming years could bring with 
them an immense amount of litigation between creators and intermediaries (publishers 
and record labels). 
¶2  This Note will discuss the effect of the termination provision, introduced in the 
1976 Act, on the music industry through an examination of the decision of Scorpio Music 
S.A. v. Willis.4 Part I will discuss the duration of copyright, the renewal right under the 
Copyright Act of 1909 (“1909 Act”), and its replacement by the termination right. Part II 
will give an in-depth discussion of the termination procedure and its relationship to the 
relevant exclusive rights under the current statute. Part II will also explore an argument in 
favor of a revised termination provision presented by a Congressman on the Committee 
on the Judiciary, a subcommittee that focuses on the area of intellectual property, 
competition, and the Internet.5 Part III will discuss how exclusive rights are assigned 
between songwriters and publishers, as well as between music artists and record labels. 
Part IV will go on to discuss the case of Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis and possible future 
arguments that will be raised by publishing companies and record labels during litigation. 
Part V will discuss the consequences of the Scorpio decision on the music industry, 
individual artists, and the public interest. Additionally, this part will address why courts 
should hesitate to side with the publishing companies and record labels when it comes to 
an artist or songwriter exercising her termination right. Part VI will conclude.  
I. THE EVOLUTION OF COPYRIGHT DURATION 
¶3  To better understand termination rights, it is necessary to learn how the duration of 
copyright was structured under the 1909 Act and how it works today. Under the 1909 
Act, published works displaying the proper copyright notice were granted a twenty-eight-
year term of copyright protection.6 The copyright owner was required to renew the 
copyright if she wanted an additional twenty-eight years of protection.7 The 1909 Act 
required the application for renewal to be made “within the year prior to the expiration of 
the original term of copyright and [set] forth a schedule listing those to whom the right 
shall accrue.”8 Additionally, if the copyright owner transferred the copyright during the 
first term, the copyright would revert back to the author once the second term began.9 On 
the other hand, if the copyright owner failed to file the renewal, the copyright protection 
would expire at the end of the original twenty-eight-year term.10  
 
3 See Laura McQuade, Record Companies Prepare for Another Copyright Battle in 2013 Over 
Termination Rights, in BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS, 1, 1–2 (Oct. 27, 2011). 
4 No. 11cv1557 BTN (RBB), 2012 WL 1598043, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012). 
5 See About the Judiciary Committee, U.S. H. REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
http://judiciary.house.gov/about/about.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013). The House Committee on the 
Judiciary has jurisdiction over other areas of interest in addition to intellectual property.  
6 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1978). 
7 Id. 
8 Theodore R. Kupferman, Note, Renewal of Copyright—Section 23 of the Copyright Act of 1909, 44 
COLUM. L. REV. 712, 714 (1944). 
9 Copyright Act of 1909 § 23. 
10 Id. 
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¶4  Essentially, authors were given the opportunity to have a second bite at the apple 
through reversion. If they were unhappy with the contract under which they transferred 
their rights the first term, they could renew and grant the copyright to someone else or 
keep it for themselves the following term. For example, if a songwriter granted a 
publishing company his copyright in a prospective hit song during the first term, he could 
renegotiate his contract with the company at the time of renewal to receive a higher 
royalty percentage. Otherwise, he could take his song elsewhere during the 
following term.  
¶5  The 1976 Act, carried over the renewal system for existing works and increased the 
length of the renewal term to forty-seven years.11 In 1992, there were many concerns 
about the abrupt expiration of copyright protection for those who forgot to file a renewal 
notice.12 And after famous movies, such as It’s a Wonderful Life and Pygmalion, lost 
copyright protection, Congress eliminated the requirement of a renewal notice; this made 
all renewals automatic.13  
II. TERMINATION UNDER CURRENT LAW 
¶6  Under current law, the copyright for post-1978 works by a single author lasts for 
the duration of the author’s life plus an additional seventy years.14 The copyright for a 
work created by joint authors, if not a work made for hire, lasts for the life of the last 
surviving author plus seventy years.15 Not only has the copyright term been extended, but 
the 1976 Act added § 203, creating a right to terminate transfers.16 The statute states, 
in part:  
In the case of any work other than a work made for hire, the exclusive or 
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of copyright or of any right under a 
copyright, executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978, otherwise than by 
will, is subject to termination . . . thirty-five years from the date of publication of 
the work under the grant . . . .17  
¶7  When Congress expanded the protection given to copyright through the Act, it 
made sure artists and songwriters who transferred their copyright in songs to music 
entities had an opportunity to reevaluate those transfers. After reevaluating, artists and 
songwriters were to determine whether to continue the status quo, negotiate for more 
money, or look elsewhere. The renewal process was replaced by the termination right. 
 
11 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 15A, DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 1, 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ15a.pdf.  
12 JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 161 (3d ed. 2010). 
13 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 11; see also ROPERT SPOO, WITHOUT COPYRIGHTS: PIRACY, 
PUBLISHING, AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 78 (2013). 
14 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). 
15 Id. § 302(b). 
16 Id. § 203(a). 
17 Id. 
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A. The Termination Provision 
¶8  The statute provides a stringent procedure for artists and songwriters who want to 
terminate a transfer of copyright. According to the statute, the artist or songwriter must 
serve a notice of termination on the music entity grantee 
at any time during a period of five years beginning at the end of thirty-five years 
from the date of execution of the grant; or, if the grant covers the right of 
publication of the work, the period begins at the end of thirty-five years from the 
date of publication of the work under the grant or at the end of forty years from 
the date of execution of the grant, whichever term ends earlier.18 
The statute also requires the artist or songwriter to state the termination effective date in 
the notice and to serve the notice between two and ten years prior to the specified 
effective date.19 On the specified effective date, all rights that were covered under the 
grant revert back to the artist or songwriter.20 
B. Relationship between Termination and Exclusive Rights of Copyright 
¶9  In the music industry, because any of the five exclusive rights of a copyright may 
be transferred, the termination right affects and applies to all of those rights: 
reproduction, distribution, performance, adaptation (ability to create derivative works) 
and display.21 Because exclusive rights are divisible and can therefore be transferred 
individually, they can also be terminated individually.22 Songwriters and music artists 
usually transfer the first four exclusive rights to their respective music entities so that 
those entities can fully exploit their music. In essence, music publishers and labels 
acquire most of the exclusive rights. They obtain the rights needed to exploit the music 
commercially, such as selling copies of the music and licensing it to the radio. This 
process is unfair to the artists and songwriters because it is only after this exploitation and 
these transfers of copyright that they could learn their music is worth much more money 
than they are receiving. The termination statute is meant to remedy this issue by giving 
artists and songwriters “a second chance to obtain fair remuneration for [their] 
creative efforts.”23  
¶10  Due to the collaboration of artists and songwriters with the labels that record their 
music and the publishers that promote their music, there is often ambiguity about 
copyright ownership.24 Recently, individuals have argued that the termination provision is 
unclear and should be revised because of this ambiguity. In 2011, Congressman John 
Conyers Jr., the Ranking Member on the House Committee on the Judiciary and a 
supporter of artists’ rights, argued that Congress should revise the copyright law to 
remove the ambiguities surrounding exactly who can reclaim ownership of songs and 
 
18 Id. § 203(a)(3). 
19 Id. § 203(a)(4). 
20 Id. § 203(b). 
21 Cf. id. §§ 106, 201(d)(2). 
22 Cf. id. § 101 (stating that copyright ownership can be transferred by any means of conveyance). 
23 Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 220 (1990). 
24 See infra Part V. 
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sound recordings.25 The congressman also claimed that labels make an enormous amount 
of money from the work of music artists “without fairly distributing these profits to 
the artists.”26  
¶11  Though the congressman’s first argument is a fair one, there are downsides to 
changing the statute. First, the legislature would have needed time to revise the law 
before 2013, when grants of copyright transfers could revert back to artists and 
songwriters who terminated their grants. The year is currently 2014, and the legislature 
has not yet passed a revision. As a result, litigation will likely be heavy between artists 
and songwriters and the music entities. Secondly, though Congress can overrule judicial 
precedent, litigation has already started, and Congress should wait to see if judicial 
resolution is sufficient before revising the statute. Lastly, the court in Scorpio Music S.A. 
v. Willis did not find the statute to be ambiguous; the court relied heavily on the literal 
meaning and legislative intent of the statute when reaching its decision.27 As more courts 
rule on this statute, it will become more transparent to the music industry. 
¶12  The Congressman’s second claim, however, is quite true. Artists usually are not 
paid enough for their music at the outset. As this paper will later discuss, artists are 
initially unaware of the value of their songs, but once the music labels and publishers 
exploit the music, a truer value is determined. The statute Congressman Conyers speaks 
of, 17 U.S.C § 203,28 actually provides artists with a second chance to be paid in 
correlation with the value of their music.  
III. SONGWRITER-PUBLISHER AND ARTIST-RECORD LABEL RELATIONS 
¶13  As previously stated, termination will affect both recording artists and songwriters; 
they both have an option to terminate transfers of copyright in their music. The next 
portion of this paper will explore the way songwriters and artists typically transfer their 
copyrights in music to their respective entities. 
A. Songwriter-Publisher Agreement 
¶14  A contract between a songwriter and a publisher contains a set of unique elements 
referred to as “deal points.”29 These deal points include “the rights transferred between 
the parties, the length of the agreement, the number of recordings to be made, and the 
financial arrangement between the songwriter and the publisher.”30 First, the songwriter’s 
transfer of copyright to the publisher is the most important part of the contract.31 As 
stated earlier, this transfer allows the publisher to exploit the songwriter’s music and 
financially gain from that exploitation. Second, along with the transfer of rights in current 
songs, songwriters will often also agree to transfer rights in their future compositions.32 
 
25 Larry Rohter, Legislator Calls for Clarifying Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2011, at C1.  
26 Id.  
27 See infra Part IV.  
28 See supra Part IIA. 
29 Todd M. Murphy, Note, Crossroads: Modern Contract Dissatisfaction as Applied to Songwriter and 
Recording Agreements, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 795, 800 (2002). 
30 Id. 
31 See id. at 801.  
32 See id. at 802. 
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This means that the songwriters agree that all compositions they make during the period 
of their contract with the publishers will solely be made for the exploitation of their 
music by the publishers.33 This is also referred to as a term-songwriter agreement.34 
¶15  Third, terms are usually tied to the delivery of a predetermined number of songs.35 
If individuals are hit-writing songwriters, they may be able to give an approximate 
number of songs they will deliver during each period of the term.36 Additionally, if the 
individuals are songwriters with clout, they have a better chance of getting publishers to 
move the term forward, despite the songwriters’ failure to deliver all the songs they 
promised.37 Finally, though there are specific percentage arrangements with respect to 
sheet music, all income from a songwriter’s compositions is traditionally split fifty-fifty 
between the songwriter and the publisher.38 Performance monies are paid directly from 
performing rights societies39 to the songwriters.40 
¶16  Though songwriters must agree to a multitude of varying terms, the publishers have 
duties as well. Through contractual agreements, publishers assume the obligation to 
exploit the compositions using their administrative rights.41 These administrative rights 
allow publishers to find people to use the songs,42 grant those users licenses,43 and ensure 
artists and songwriters receive payment.44 Publishers indeed play an important role in the 
success of their songwriters.  
B. Music Artist—Recording Label Agreement 
¶17  A contract between an artist and a recording label contains deal points differing 
from those present in a songwriter–publisher contract. The relevant points for this 
discussion are: how many (record commitment), how long (term), and delivery 
requirements (type). Some of these elements illustrate how record deals seem to be more 
favorable for the labels than the artists. 
1. How Many Tracks or Albums? 
¶18  Most labels will commit to record a certain number of albums, usually one 
(referred to as “firm albums”), while maintaining the option to require an additional five 
to six albums, each one at the label’s discretion (option albums).45 Sometimes they may 
 
33 Id. 
34 DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 281–82 (8th ed. 2012). 
35 Id. at 285. 
36 Id. at 285–86. 
37 Id. at 286. 
38 See id. at 220–21. 
39 Performing Rights Societies (PRSs) license performing rights to a publisher’s entire catalog to places 
such as radio and television stations, concert halls, etc. The publisher receives a share of the fee charged for 
every license a PRS negotiates. See id. at 238–40; infra Part V. 
40 PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 277. 
41 Id. at 219–20. 
42 Id. One of the responsibilities of a publisher is to introduce the artist’s music to film producers for 
soundtrack music; magazines for articles, cover shoots, etc.; and recording labels for purchase.  
43 See infra Part V. 
44 PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 219–20. 
45 Id. at 104. 
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commit to record only one or two masters.46 This allows the label to see if an artist has 
potential, while giving the label the option to drop the artist if they are not worth the 
price.47 For example, usually, if a label decides to commit to two albums and the first 
album is unsuccessful, the label has the right to opt out of recording the second album.48 
According to Passman, options are never good for artists.49 He argues, “[i]f [the artist’s 
music is] a flop, [she’ll] never see the money; if [the artist’s music is] a success, it will 
probably be less than [the artist is] worth.”50 Options are a way for record labels to get out 
of deals.51  
2. How Long Will The Relationship Last? 
¶19  After years of figuring out a way to best clarify a time period for an artist contract, 
labels have finally adopted a custom of using terms. Multiple provisions are included in 
contracts either to keep labels in check (based on prior litigation) or to make sure artists 
do not have more control than they should. The first provision states that “each period 
ends six to nine months after delivery of the last album required for that period, but it can 
be no less than a specified minimum (e.g., eighteen months).”52 A period is a portion of a 
term, and a term is the amount of time a record label keeps an artist under an exclusive 
agreement.53 Passman provides the following example of this type of provision: “if [an 
artist is] required to record two albums, the period might start upon the signing of [the 
artist’s] deal and end six months after delivery of the second album, but no sooner than 
eighteen months after signing.”54 This provision plainly notifies an artist of the exact 
amount of time that constitutes a term.  
¶20  A second provision notifies artists that labels can withdraw from a contract if 
albums are not delivered within a designated amount of time. The provision usually states 
that the label may pull out of the deal if the artist fails to deliver an album “within a 
certain period of time after delivery of the previous album (usually twelve to eighteen 
months . . .).”55 The time-period is negotiable depending upon the artist’s 
bargaining power.56  
¶21  The final provision protects record labels from having to accept more than one 
album at a time. This provision states that an artist cannot start recording a new album 
until she has delivered the prior album “and that the new album can’t be delivered sooner 
than six months after delivery of the prior album.”57 This allows the publisher, along with 
 
46 See id. A master is the original recording of a song made in the studio, and the recording from which 
all copies are made. Id. at 72. 
47 Id. at 104–07. 
48 Id. at 104. 
49 Id. at 105–07. 
50 Id. at 106. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 109. 
53 Id. at 107. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 109. 
57 Id. 
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the artist, to obtain the maximum financial benefit from each album.58 During the periods 
of time specified in the provisions, the artist will make records exclusively for the label.59  
3. Delivery Requirements 
¶22  The delivery requirement relates to the types of music labels will accept. An artist’s 
contract will state whether she is to deliver commercially satisfactory or technically 
satisfactory recordings. If the contract requires the work to be commercially satisfactory, 
the label is only required to take recordings if it believes they will sell.60 In other words, if 
a label does not like the commercial prospects of the music, the artist must come up with 
something else. On the other hand, if the contract says technically satisfactory, as long as 
the recording is technically made well, the label must take it.61 According to Passman, if 
an artist reaches superstar level, she will likely have a lower threshold to fulfill under the 
technically satisfactory requirement.62 In this case, the label may not have to approve the 
recording but may “have language saying the recordings must be of a ‘style’ (and perhaps 
even a ‘quality’) similar to [the artist’s] previous recordings.”63 As artists move up the 
ladder of success, they are given more control over the music their label releases.  
C. Terminating a Contract as an Artist or Songwriter 
¶23  While the above deal points seem to provide labels with a large amount of control 
and protection, there seems to be none of the same for artists. If a songwriter or artist 
becomes unhappy with her publishing or recording deal, terminating either will be very 
difficult. There are three ways for an artist or songwriter to terminate a contract with a 
music entity: “(1) a decision of the court; (2) a declaration of bankruptcy; or (3) a 
reversion of rights.”64  
¶24  The action used by a court to nullify the contract is known as rescission. A court 
makes a determination after examining the reasonableness and legitimacy of the artist’s 
discontent.65 Parties seeking to nullify the contract typically argue “unconscionability, 
undue influence, and unequal bargaining power.”66 If the court agrees with one of the 
arguments, the contract at issue is nullified and the aggrieved party can be entitled to 
damages.67 The second method of termination involves the ability of a person in 
bankruptcy to reject undesirable contracts.68 While filing bankruptcy is the most common 
tactic used by artists to terminate their recording contracts, songwriters also sometimes 
 
58 Id. at 109–10.  
59 Id. at 171. 
60 Id. at 110. 
61 Id. at 111. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 




68 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). A rejected contract in bankruptcy is treated as though the debtor had 
breached the contract immediately before filing their bankruptcy petition, which entitles the contractual 
counterparty to damages at the same priority as other unsecured creditors. Id. § 365(g). 
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use it as a financial tool to terminate an undesirable contract.69 Though this method is not 
used as often as it was in the past,70 it remains a tool to assist artists when convenient. 
The final method of termination, a reversion of rights, is available to songwriters and may 
occur if the publisher failed to adhere to the terms of the contract.71 This method is also 
possible when an artist or songwriter terminates her grant under § 203.72 
¶25  The first two above-referenced methods are cumbersome, time-consuming, can be 
difficult to obtain, and predominantly deal with terminating a contract. Therefore, the last 
method is most important because it provides artists with that second bite at the apple and 
is likely less burdensome for them. 
IV. SCORPIO MUSIC S.A. V. VICTOR WILLIS  
¶26  The Southern District of California is thus far the sole court that has decided a case 
under 17 U.S.C. § 203 in the music context.73 In Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, Defendant 
Victor Willis, a songwriter and former lead singer of the group The Village People, 
served a notice of termination on the plaintiffs, music publishing companies Scorpio 
Music S.A. (“Scorpio”), Can’t Stop Productions, Inc. (“CSP”), and Can’t Stop Music.74 
The songwriter intended to terminate his musical works grant with respect to thirty-three 
compositions, including the hit song “Y.M.C.A.”.75 In return, Scorpio filed suit, and 
Willis filed a motion to dismiss.76 The court was faced with the issue of whether a 
songwriter who composes a piece with other authors and transfers his respective 
copyright interest in the piece through a separate agreement can terminate his grant of 
copyright, or whether a notice from the majority of the authors is necessary for a valid 
termination.77 Scorpio argued that Willis’s notice of termination was invalid under 17 
U.S.C. § 203(a)(1).78 In the case of joint authorship, a majority of the authors “who 
transferred their copyright interests in a joint work” must terminate in order for any of the 
authors to regain ownership rights in the compositions.79  
¶27  Scorpio also sought declaration that if Willis was found to have a right to terminate 
his transfer, he be limited to the same “percentage ownership as he receive[d] as 
compensation relating to the Compositions and as set forth in the Agreements.”80 For 
 
69 See Murphy, supra note 29, at 807. 
70 Justin Pritchard, Striking a Chord with Congress, L.A. TIMES Aug. 19, 1998, available at, 
http://articles.latimes.com/1998/aug/19/business/fi-14460. During the mid-to-late 1990s, many famous 
music artists used bankruptcy as a way to terminate their contracts with music entities and in most 
circumstances to “land a more lucrative deal with another studio.” This became such a problem that the 
record industry asked Congress to pass legislation to make it harder for artists to use bankruptcy as a means 
of ending a contract. Though a bill was drafted, it was never passed by both houses. See id. 
71 Murphy, supra note 29, at 807. 
72 See supra Part II. 
73 Courts have applied the termination provision in other contexts such as superhero comic book 
characters. See, e.g., Marvel Characters, Inc. v. Kirby, No. 11-3333-cv, 2013 WL 4016875 (2d Cir. Aug. 8, 
2013). 
74 Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557, 2012 WL 1598043, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 7, 2012).  
75 Id. at *1. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at *1–2. 
78 Id. at *1. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at *5. 
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example, under the Adaptation Agreement signed for “YMCA,” though the song was 
written by Willis and two others, Willis received only 20% royalties on the song.81 
Scorpio intended to keep Willis’s royalty percentage where it was.  
¶28  The court ruled against Scorpio and granted Willis’s motion to dismiss.82 The court 
held that: (1) a joint author who separately transfers his copyright interest may 
unilaterally terminate that grant, and (2) under 17 U.S.C. § 203(b), upon termination, the 
author is entitled to the percentage of copyright interests “he transferred—his undivided 
interest in the whole.”83 In the case of Willis’s allotted percentage of royalties to 
“YMCA,” Willis had a one-third undivided copyright interest in the composition and was 
therefore entitled to such upon reversion.84  
¶29  The court used two methods of statutory interpretation to reach its conclusion. 
First, it focused on the plain meaning of the statute. The court analyzed the differences 
between joint authors who grant their copyright interests as a unit and authors who 
individually grant copyright interests in their portion of the composition.85 The court 
interpreted § 203(a)(1) as stating that when a grant is executed by one author, she alone 
can terminate the grant.86 A majority of joint authors may terminate a grant if they 
together executed the grant.87 The court determined that, because the provision refers to a 
“grant” in the singular when discussing joint execution, it is only in that context a 
majority is necessary.88 The court further determined that “[i]f . . . a single joint author 
enters into a grant of his copyright interest, that author alone can terminate his grant.”89 
¶30  Second, the court looked at the 1976 Act’s legislative history. To determine 
Willis’s ownership percentage, the court relied on the House Report that accompanied the 
1976 Act during its passage.90 The Report analogized § 203(a)(1) joint authorship 
interests to interests of tenants in common. The Report stated: “Under the bill, as under 
the present law, coowners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in 
common, with each coowner having an independent right to use or license the use of a 
work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any profits.”91 By 
analyzing the plain language of the statute and focusing on Congress’s intention, the 
court created the initial and only case law precedent on the issue of termination in the 
music context.  
¶31  Though the court dismissed the case, it did grant leave for Scorpio to amend its 
complaint. The court allowed Scorpio to seek declaratory judgment regarding the dispute 
between the parties about the percentage of copyright interest Willis actually had in 
certain songs.92 The court noted that knowledge of authorship was important because it 
 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at *5, 7. 
83 See id.  
84 See id.  
85 Id. at *2.  
86 Id. at *3. 
87 Id. 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 121 (1976), quoted in Scorpio Music at *3. 
92 Scorpio Music at *6. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 4  
 
 140
would determine how much Willis was entitled to receive relative to the other 
joint authors.93  
¶32  The court’s decision to allow Scorpio to seek declaratory judgment regarding 
Willis’s percentage of interest led to another issue that courts will be forced to handle. 
One month following the court’s decision, Scorpio filed an amended complaint seeking a 
“judicial determination of the respective shares of the authors of the Compositions.”94 
Scorpio claimed Willis translated the song lyrics to the twenty-four songs in dispute and 
shares the copyright to the musical work portion of the songs with the original foreign 
composer.95 Scorpio also contended that Willis’s assertion that he shares the copyright 
with only one other person is barred by a statute of limitations as well as the equitable 
doctrine of laches.96 
¶33  In contrast, Willis argued that none of the disputed songs were translated by him 
and were instead created as new and original works.97 Willis filed a counterclaim for 
declaratory relief seeking 50% interest in the copyrights to each of the twenty-four songs 
in dispute.98 He argued the foreign songwriter had no claim to half of his interest because 
Willis did not translate any of the twenty-four disputed songs to English based on foreign 
language lyrics.99 Willis’s counterclaim also added the foreign composer, Henri Belolo, 
as a defendant to the dispute.100 Willis alleged Belolo used his power as the managing and 
sole director of CSP to negatively affect Willis.101 Specifically, Willis alleged Belolo “has 
dominated, controlled, directed, caused, and guided the conduct of CSP complained of 
for his own personal gain, benefit, interest, and to the detriment of Willis.”102 
¶34  Scorpio responded to Willis’s counterclaim three months later and sought to 
dismiss the counterclaim because it was barred by the statute of limitations under 17 
U.S.C. § 507(b).103 Under the statute, “[n]o civil action shall be maintained . . . unless it is 
commenced within three years after the claim accrued.”104 Scorpio argued Willis had 
known about his shared copyright status with Belolo for well over three years.105 The 
court depended on the explanation provided by the Zuill v. Shanahan106 court when 
making its decision. The Zuill court explained that “claims of co-ownership, as distinct 
from claims of infringement, accrue when plain and express repudiation of co-ownership 
is communicated to the claimant, and are barred three years from the time of 
repudiation.”107 From this explanation, the Willis court determined that “§ 507(b) operates 
 
93 Id.  
94 First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Scorpio Music v. Willis, No. 11cv1557 (S.D. Cal. 
June 5, 2012). 
95 See id. at 4. 
96 Id. at 7–8. 
97 Defendant Victor Willis’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for Declaratory Relief and 
Counterclaim at 11, Scorpio Music v. Willis, No. 11cv1557 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2012) at *11. 
98 Id. at 20. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 5. 
101 Id. at 8. 
102 Id.  
103 Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557, 2013 WL 790940, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2013). 
104 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2006). 
105 See Scorpio Music, 2013 WL 790940, at *5.  
106 80 F.3d 1366 (9th Cir. 1996). 
107 Scorpio Music, 2013 WL 790940 at *2 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Zuill, 80 F.3d 1366, 1369).  
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as it normally does,” even when there is an issue of co-authorship in the context of grant 
termination.108 The court lastly denied Scorpio’s motion to dismiss and held that there 
was an issue of fact as to whether Willis knew he was considered to have co-authored the 
songs with Belolo and, consequently, whether his counterclaim was barred by the statute 
of limitations.109 
¶35  The percentage-of-interest and co-ownership issues set out above are additional 
matters the courts will have to resolve in termination disputes. In the case of joint works, 
this leeway will provide publishers and record labels with another way to prolong the 
termination process. As the plaintiff in this case has shown, publishers and labels will 
want to keep any interests that may revert back to the artist at a minimum.  
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE SCORPIO DECISION 
A. Future Record Label and Publisher Arguments 
¶36  Though Scorpio Music v. Willis has created precedent on this issue, there will be a 
plethora of litigation far beyond 2013. And although the district court’s decision is not 
binding on other federal courts in other jurisdictions, it will likely be persuasive to those 
courts. As more litigation arises, music publishers and record labels will have various 
arguments. While the music publishers will be concerned with the musical works portion 
of the music, the record labels will focus on the sound recording interests.  
1. Record Label Arguments 
¶37  Record labels may argue that the recordings were a work made for hire. According 
to the relevant portion of 17 U.S.C. § 101, a work is a work made for hire if it was 
prepared “by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.”110 A work is also 
considered a work made for hire if it is (1) “specially ordered or commissioned,” (2) falls 
within certain categories of work, and (3) the parties signed an agreement designating it 
to be a work made for hire.111  
¶38  For example, in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, an organization that 
advocated for the right of the homeless in America retained an artist to “produce a 
sculpture that would depict the plight of the homeless and be displayed at the annual 
Christmastime Pageant of Peace in the District of Columbia.”112 The organization paid 
$15,000 for the production of the sculpture, but the sculptor did not charge for his actual 
services.113 The sculptor accepted most of the organization’s suggestions and directions as 
to the sculpture’s configuration and appearance.114 When the sculptor wanted to use the 
sculpture for a purpose not related to the organization, the organization claimed the 
 
108 Id. at *3. 
109 See id. at *6.  
110 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
111 Id. 
112 Daniel Porter, Note, Then I Saw the Contract, Now I’m a Believer: Why “Concept Groups” Are 
“Works for Hire” and Cannot Invoke Statutory Termination Rights After 2013, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 507, 
518 (2012) (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989)). 
113 Id. 
114 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 734 (1989). 
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sculpture was a work made for hire. The court held that because the sculptor worked in 
his own studio, purchased his own supplies, was not provided any type of employee 
benefits, and the contract between the parties did not designate the sculpture as a work 
made for hire, the sculptor was an independent contractor, and therefore at least jointly 
owned the copyright to the work.115  
¶39  Though standard recording contracts state that anything the artist records is 
considered a work made for hire, labels will have to choose exactly which work made for 
hire category the work fits into.116 The grant cannot be terminated if a label can show that 
the work was a work made for hire.117 The labels’ most convincing argument is that the 
work fits into the compilation category. To satisfy a work made for hire category, labels 
may argue that both masters118 and albums are compilations under § 101.119 Under § 101, 
a compilation is defined as “a work formed by the collection and assembling of 
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way 
that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. The term 
‘compilation’ includes collective works.”120  
¶40  Recordings first involve placing music on masters. These recordings are multi-
track, “meaning that each instrument and voice part is recorded on a separate track or 
channel: the drums on one track, guitar on another, voice on another, etc.”121 Once the 
recording is finished, the master is then edited, mixed, and equalized (“EQ’d”).122 This 
means the music is spliced, the volume levels for each type of track are adjusted, and the 
bass, midrange, and treble levels are balanced.123 Labels will likely base their compilation 
argument on this process. Labels could contend that by combining, editing, and adjusting 
the levels of multiple tracks, after first recording the tracks individually, the labels in 
essence collect and assemble the pre-existing tracks and make them into a single song. 
The resulting work could then be considered an original work of authorship, because the 
separately recorded tracks are combined to create a single song. 
¶41  In case labels lose the argument on masters, they could also argue that a complete 
album in itself is a work made for hire. They could argue that taking recordings and 
compiling them onto an album in a particular order is enough to fulfill the creativity 
requirement under a compilation.124 In this scenario, though the labels would not own a 
copyright in each individual song, they would own a copyright to the album itself. To 
fulfill the entire requirement,125 labels could also state that they contracted with the artist 
for her to provide the voice or instrumentals on the recordings, and that the artist signed a 
contract that stated the work was a work made for hire. If the labels are able to prove this 
 
115 Id. at 752–53. 
116 See Randy S. Frisch & Matthew J. Fortnow, Termination of Copyrights in Sound Recordings: Is 
There a Leak in the Record Company Vaults?, 17 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 211, 217 (1993). 17 U.S.C. § 101 
does not include recordings as a work made for hire category. 
117 17 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2006). 
118 A master is a recording of a particular song. See PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 72. 
119 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 116, at 222. 
120 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
121 PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 72. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 116, at 222. 
125 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (outlining the statutory requirements). 
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argument, the album would be considered one made for hire. Though these are the most 
realistic arguments on which labels could win, courts have yet to decide whether these 
will be successful arguments. 
¶42  On the contrary, courts may potentially consider artists to be independent 
contractors who own the copyright to the recordings. Courts are less likely to see artists 
as employees because labels do not offer benefits, artists are given discretion as to how 
long they take to learn and record a new song and make an album, and artists have a 
particular skill the labels needs: their voice, instrument playing, or both.126  
¶43  In response to labels’ arguments regarding the masters, artists could argue that, 
though the labels offered their facilities for the recordings to take place (and even this is 
rare),127 they did not contribute enough to the work to obtain a copyright interest in the 
work. This argument will be especially beneficial for those artists who play an 
instrument, because they are providing both the voice and music; they could argue that 
the labels only provide a background for the artists. This argument is supported by the 
fact that, over time, artists have come to be the individuals who hire and pay royalties to 
the producer.128 Similar to what the labels could claim is their function, a producer “is 
responsible for bringing the creative product into tangible form” as a recording by 
“finding and selecting songs, deciding on arrangements, [and] getting the right vocal 
sound.”129 The producer also has administrative duties such as booking studios and hiring 
musicians.130 Though the duties above are satisfactory to establish the title of author to 
the producer, it is due to the producer’s subordinate position that he or she is not the 
author. The producer is solely commissioned by the artist to enhance her music, and, 
thus, anything the producer creates is in essence a work made for hire for the artist.131   
¶44  In response to the labels’ argument regarding albums, artists could argue they own 
the songs on the albums. If artists are found to own the copyright to the individual songs, 
the record labels’ album argument will become moot. For example, if a record label 
created an album by combining the songs of an artist already determined to have a 
copyright in those songs onto one album, the label would essentially be attempting to 
create a derivative work without the owner’s permission.132  
2. Publisher Arguments 
¶45  Publishers could also argue they are entitled to retain the rights to music because of 
joint authorship. Unlike the joint authorship argument in Scorpio, some publishers may 
consider themselves to be one of the joint authors. Some “creative” publishers combine 
their own writers with other songwriters, “help them fine-tune their writing, match 
 
126 See Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 116, at 219–20; cf. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 
U.S. 730, 751–53. In Community for Creative Non-Violence, the court looked to the above-mentioned 
factors, among others, to establish whether an individual was an employee or independent contractor. See 
Porter, supra note 112, at 519–20. 
127 Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 116, at 220. 
128 PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 126–27. 
129 Id. at 120. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 126; Frisch & Fortnow, supra note 116, at 226–27. 
132 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  
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writers with artists, etc.”133 By functioning in the described manner, these publishers 
could say they have contributed to the overall work. To succeed in that argument, the 
publishers will have to show that they significantly contributed something to the 
originality and creativity of the piece.134 This argument will either succeed or fail 
depending upon whether another court interprets the statutory language concerning joint 
authorship termination in the same way the Scorpio court did. If other courts determine 
that a separate transfer of a songwriter’s partial ownership in a song will allow them to 
unilaterally terminate that transfer, a publisher’s partial ownership as a joint author of the 
song will not void the artist’s eligibility to terminate so long as the artist executed a 
separate transfer. Additionally, the success of the argument will depend on the specific 
facts of each particular case. If later courts follow suit with the Scorpio court on similar 
factual cases, the publishers will only be successful if they can prove the songwriter 
transferred her interest to the publisher as a joint work.  
¶46  Secondly, publishers may attempt to argue that the work was a work made for hire. 
By bringing together different songwriters, as well as connecting music artists with 
songwriters, publishers could argue they brought together the individual parties for the 
purpose of creating specific musical works. Framed this way, the argument sounds as 
though the publishers commissioned a compilation; they brought together multiple 
individuals who would create new collective songs. This argument is unlikely to be 
convincing because songwriters are usually seen as joint authors when they create songs 
together.135  
¶47  The reasoning under the second argument may work best under a collective works 
argument. According to 17 U.S.C. § 201(c), one person can have a copyright in an entire 
work, while contributors to that work maintain a copyright in each portion they 
contributed.136 For example, a publisher could combine two different sections of a song 
that were written by two different songwriters. The songwriters would have copyrights in 
their individual portions, and the publisher would have a copyright in its compilation of 
those sections. Only time will tell if courts apply termination to works made for hire in 
the same manner the Scorpio court applied it to joint authorship. 
B. How the Scorpio Decision Affects the Music Industry 
1. The Way Business is Currently Done 
¶48  The termination of transfer provision and the decision rendered by the Scorpio 
court could have a major effect on the music industry. Publishers as well as record labels 
may experience a large decrease in royalties, while individual artists and songwriters may 
gain an immense amount of bargaining power that will likely lead to a higher royalty 
percentage. This section will explore how publishers and labels currently make a large 
portion of their money and how those portions will change or disappear.  
¶49  Music publishers make a significant amount of their money by asserting their right 
to reproduce and distribute the musical compositions, or musical works, through the 
 
133 PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 222. 
134 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (definition of a joint work); see also, e.g., Janky v. Lake County 
Convention & Visitors Bureau, 576 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding joint authorship in a song). 
135 See 17 U.S.C. § 101. 
136 Id. § 201(c). 
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granting of two types of licenses: mechanical and performance.137 “Mechanical licenses 
are the most common tool used to account for a composition’s profits . . . [and] account 
for the profits generated by the physical copies of the composition.”138 This type of 
license serves as the main royalty source for a publishing company, because record labels 
pay publishing companies for the right to use a song in records.139 Though a publishing 
company could issue these licenses itself, most use the Harry Fox Agency to do so.140  
¶50  Performance licenses make up most of the rest of the income that publishing 
companies receive on compositions.141 “A performance is any means through which the 
public is exposed to the songwriter’s work.”142 By using performance rights societies 
such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), and 
Broadcast Music, Incorporated (BMI) to sell blanket licenses to radio and television 
stations, concert halls, etc., publishers receive a share of the monies collected.143 The 
societies will usually split the income fifty-fifty between the songwriters and the 
publishers.144 The more popular a song or artist, the more money record companies and 
venues that want to use and perform the music will be willing to pay. 
2. Changes 
¶51  Due to the interpretation of § 203 by the Scorpio court, publishers will no longer 
retain the distribution and reproduction right if the songwriter chooses not to negotiate. If 
the songwriter does choose to renegotiate, and her music has brought the publisher a 
large royalty income, the publisher will likely improve many deal points the songwriter 
requests (though the fifty-fifty royalty income will likely remain the same because it is 
standard). In either scenario, whether a songwriter chooses not to negotiate and take their 
music elsewhere or negotiate for a larger royalty percentage, the publishers will make 
less money than they do now. Record labels will be affected in the same way, with the 
exception that, because they deal with some exclusive rights publishers do not, they will 
no longer have the right to license the sound recordings for distribution, reproduction, or 
performance. Also, because the termination provision allows for the termination of both 
exclusive and non-exclusive grants of transfers or licenses of a copyright, both entities 
will be affected by the absence of the right to create derivative works.145 However, they 
will be able to continue utilizing any derivative works that were prepared under the 
authority of the grant before its termination.146 This limitation does not extend to the 
 
137 See Murphy, supra note 29, at 804–05. 
138 Id. at 804. 
139 See PASSMAN, supra note 34 at 224–25. 
140 See id. at 225. The Harry Fox Agency is an organization that exists for the purpose of issuing 
mechanical licenses for publishing companies in exchange for a certain percentage of gross monies 
collected. 
141 Murphy, supra note 29, at 805. 
142 Id. 
143 PASSMAN, supra note 34, at 238–39. A blanket license gives each music user the right to perform all 
of the compositions controlled by every publisher that is affiliated with the Performance Rights Society. Id. 
at 239. 
144 See Bernard Korman & I. Fred Koenigsberg, Performing Rights in Music and Performing Rights 
Societies, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 332, 365 (1986).  
145 17 U.S.C. § 203 (a) (2006). 
146 Id. § 203(b)(1).    
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preparation of other derivative works based upon the copyright work after 
the termination.147  
¶52  As a result of the Scorpio decision, once songwriters recover their rights to 
distribute and reproduce their work, they will no longer have to go through the publishing 
company or the Harry Fox Agency. If an artist chooses not to bargain for a better deal but 
instead executes her reversion right in her copyright, record labels will have to receive a 
license directly from the artist, while venues would have to do the same for a 
performance license. On the other hand, record labels will be able to obtain a compulsory 
license on the songs as long as they pay the statutory rate.148 As this relates to the Scorpio 
case, if Willis chooses not to negotiate and instead terminates his transfer of rights to the 
publisher, he will have his full ownership percentage of rights back in each composition 
and will therefore receive money that the publisher no longer will.149 If Willis at any point 
decides to serve a notice of termination on the record label for his interest in the sound 
recording, he would also receive his portion of rights in the sound recording. In the end, 
when an artist who is a songwriter terminates her grant of copyright with both the 
publishing company and the record label, she would own the copyright interest in the 
entire song (assuming the song is not a joint work). This would make the artist or 
songwriter a one-stop shop for those in need of mechanical and performance licenses.  
¶53  Those music artists who choose to renegotiate with their publishers and recording 
labels, and continue to make albums, may receive other benefits in addition to the 
bargaining power related to royalties they procured through the Scorpio decision. In 
essence, those artists obtain leverage and become similar to superstar artists—those who 
will not have to deal with options.150 The artists will have the power to walk away 
following the completion of each album, instead of giving the record labels the option to 
commit to two albums while having the power to require an additional four or five at the 
label’s discretion.151 If an option remains, superstars will likely be more successful 
negotiating increased royalties for the optional albums.152  
¶54  For those artists or songwriters who choose to take their music to another publisher 
or record label, not only will they benefit from the higher royalty percentage they will 
receive, but they will bring in royalties for the new entity they have chosen to contract 
with. Those new entities will obtain the rights to license the music, and therefore, collect 




148 17 U.S.C. § 115 allows labels and other organizations to obtain compulsory licenses by stating, in 
part: “When phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work have been distributed to the public in the United 
States under the authority of the copyright owner, any other person, including those who make 
phonorecords or digital phonorecord deliveries, may, by complying with the provisions of this section, 
obtain a compulsory license to make and distribute phonorecords of the work. A person may obtain a 
compulsory license only if his or her primary purpose in making phonorecords is to distribute them to the 
public for private use, including by means of a digital phonorecord delivery.” 
149 See generally Scorpio Music S.A. v. Willis, No. 11cv1557, 2012 WL 1598043, at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 
7, 2012). 
150 Cf. Passman, supra note 34, at 105–06. 
151 Id. at 105. 
152 See id. at 105–06. 
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3. Public Policy 
¶55  The Scorpio decision serves a powerful public policy interest as well. The 
interpretation of the statute by the court shows that copyright continues to protect the 
interest of the author of a work. The decision also serves the purpose of incentivizing 
others to continue to make music without fear of permanently losing their rights to the 
publishers and music companies that may take advantage of them in the beginning. 
Additionally, it can be argued that the decision puts individuals on notice regarding joint 
authorship; if one chooses to participate in a joint work, she should transfer her interest in 
the work through a separate agreement.153   
¶56  The Scorpio decision could also have a negative effect on social policy. At the 
outset of a recording or publishing deal, labels and publishers are now aware that at least 
one court has interpreted § 203 to mean artists and songwriters can terminate transfers 
thirty-five years later in their own songs and songs they created jointly. As a result, there 
is a possibility artists will receive even worse deals. Publishers and labels, in attempts to 
get the most out of their investment, may negotiate even lower-paying royalties and less 
favorable deal points. Though this is a possibility, this negative effect does not exceed the 
benefits that come with the Scorpio decision. Although artists may receive worse deals, 
they will know that thirty-five years later they will have a chance to change them. All a 
good artist needs is for her music and talents to be exploited. After that, she not only 
understands the worth of her music, but music entities understand that the artist is aware 
of that worth as well.   
C. Why Courts Should Hesitate to Side with Music Publishers and Record Labels 
¶57  There are valid reasons why courts should be hesitant to side with publishing 
companies and record labels regarding termination. First, new artists and songwriters 
enter into contracts that are not legally sound and financially fair due to their ignorance of 
the business, along with other things.154 By ruling in favor of the publishers and labels, it 
would be as though the court is encouraging the music entities to continue exploiting less 
sophisticated musicians. Second, as illustrated in earlier sections, it is quite difficult for 
an artist or publisher to get out of a contract, let alone to receive her copyright back in her 
works. Not giving artists and songwriters back their copyrights would equate to the court 
taking away that second bite at the apple that Congress intended: the chance for artists 
and songwriters to renegotiate their agreements. Lastly, if the courts side with publishers 
and labels, they run the risk of deterring individuals from entering the business solely 
based on fears of never being able to own their music again. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶58  The year 2013 was an important year for many artists and publishers, and 2014 will 
likely continue to bring with it an abundance of litigation. Due to § 203, music publishers 
 
153 Cf. Scorpio Music at *5. 
154 See Murphy, supra note 29, at 808 (“An artist’s intense desire to obtain a recording contract at the 
beginning of his or her career often hampers the pursuit of a contract that is legally sound and financially 
fair.”). 
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and record labels may no longer be allowed to indefinitely receive large royalties for 
certain songs while their true authors receive very little. Though publishers and record 
labels will contest their requirement to relinquish ownership of the music under 
arguments related to works made for hire and joint authorship, courts will likely consider 
artists and songwriters to be independent contractors. Also, though litigation will be very 
costly for the music entities, it is fair to argue that the publishers and labels might lose 
much more money if they are unable to hold on to the rights of certain songs. Those 
songs that have made a lasting impression not only in the United States but across the 
world have brought publishers and labels financial security that they cannot afford to 
lose. Nonetheless, despite what the loss of copyright interests will do to the music 
business, the courts should be more concerned with continuing the true and overall 
purpose of copyright: to promote the progress of creativity by authors.155 
 
 
155 The purpose of the Copyright Act is to “promote the Progress of Science . . . by securing for limited 
Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
  
